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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
"OF DEATHS PUT ON BY CUNNING AND FORCED CAUSE":
REALITY BITES THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
THE CIGARETTE PAPERS, by Stanton A. Glantz, John Slade, Lisa
A. Bero, Peter Hanauer, and Deborah E. Barnes. University of
California Press, Berkeley, Cal., 1996. Pp. 539. $29.95.
SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
COVER-UP, by Philip J. Hilts. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Reading,
Mass., 1996. Pp. 253. $22.00.
ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR,
THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP
MORRIS, by Richard Kluger. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, N.Y.,
1996. Pp. 807. $35.00.
PAUL A. LEBEL"
Immediately after the death of Hamlet, confronted by de-
mands from Fortinbras and the English ambassadors for an ex-
planation of what has occurred, Horatio responds:
And let me speak to the yet unknowing world
How these things came about: so shall you hear
Of carnal, bloody, and unnatural acts,
Of accidental judgements, casual slaughters,
Of deaths put on by cunning and forced cause,
And, in this upshot, purposes mistook
Fall'n on the inventors' heads: all this can I
Truly deliver.1
* James Gould Cutler Professor of Law, College of William & Mary School of Law.
1. Wa.;LAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 5, sc. 2, In. 390-97 (Hardin Craig ed.,
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It is a telling measure of the profound moral ambivalence
evoked by the history recounted in these recent books about the
tobacco industry that one seeks an allusion in the works of
Shakespeare rather than in the Nuremberg trials for crimes
against humanity.2 Nevertheless, Richard Kluger, Philip Hilts,
and Stanton Glantz and his colleagues do "Truly deliver" a pow-
erful indictment of the behavior of the tobacco industry over the
last forty years, with much of the most damning evidence com-
ing from the industry's own files.
What will ultimately turn out to have "Fall'n on the inventors'
heads" is still very much an open question in the context of how
this society and its legal system deal with the health effects of
smoking. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has promul-
gated the jurisdictional predicate for regulating cigarettes as a
medical device for the delivery of the drug nicotine.' On a differ-
ent legal front, an August 9, 1996, verdict by a Florida jury in
Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.4 awarding three-
quarters of a million dollars in damages to a lung cancer victim
and his wife offers more than a little encouragement to those
who are committed to pursuing a litigation strategy against the
industry.5 From the perspective of the ordinary citizen observ-
ing the power exerted by the tobacco industry, the gap between
realism and pessimism may have shrunk to the point where it is
difficult to shake the belief that raw emotion and political power
struggles will affect the resolution of the tobacco and health is-
sues as much as will reason and scientific inquiry. What is con-
siderably clearer after an encounter with the story told in the
sixteen hundred pages of these three books is that we can no
Scott, Foreman & Co. 1961).
2. For another invocation of Shakespeare in tobacco litigation, see Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting from WLIJA
SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 1, sc. 2).
3. See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These
Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619 (1996) [hereinafter FDA Juris-
diction].
4. No. 95-00934 CA (Fla. Dist Ct. Aug. 9, 1996).
5. The verdict in Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. is reported by
Nick Ravo, Stricken Smoker Awarded $750,000, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1996, at Al.
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longer plausibly be said to inhabit a "yet unknowing world" with
regard to these "deaths put on by cunning and forced cause."
These books lay out the background against which the current
round of litigation and regulatory measures needs to be evaluat-
ed and the future courses of conduct planned. Richard Kiuger's
Ashes to Ashes6 is a detailed social history of cigarettes in the
United States. Kiuger is probably best known as the author of
Simple Justice,7 a justifiably acclaimed history of the legal bat-
tle for school desegregation. Just as that book gave the reader
an exposure to the development of the strategy that culminated
in a declaration of the unconstitutionality of school segregation
in Brown v. Board of Education,' Ashes to Ashes takes the read-
er into the operations of the various parties-tobacco companies,
scientific researchers, public interest groups, the public health
community, the smoking public, anti-smoking advocates, state
and federal legislators, and government administrative' officials
in a variety of agencies-with an interest in the role that ciga-
rettes play in this society.'
Kluger's book is comprehensive in its attention to the product
development, marketing, scientific research, lobbying, and legal
maneuvers that have encircled cigarettes since their serious in-
troduction into American commerce more than a century ago. As
the book's subtitle suggests, the progress made by Philip Morris
from minor player to industry leader plays a prominent role in
Kluger's history.0
The other two books are more narrowly focused than Ashes to
Ashes, which surveys the entire history of cigarette production
and smoking, seeming to devote at least some attention to every
imaginable aspect of that history. Both New York Times reporter
Philip Hilts, in Smokescreen,11 and the collaborators on The Cig-
6. RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE
WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996).
7. RICHARD KLUGER, ShOLE JUSTICE (1976).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. All three of the books reviewed here give little attention to the agricultural
side of the tobacco business. Kiuger proposes eliminating the federal price support
for tobacco, and recommends a transition period in which tobacco growers would re-
ceive subsidies. KLUGER, supra note 6, at 762.
10. See id. at 765. Kluger focuses on Philip Morris, in part, because of the consid-
erable file access granted by the company.
11. PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
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arette Papers12 concentrate on a much more narrow and disturb-
ing feature of that landscape-the decades-long deception about
the health effects of smoking that the tobacco companies perpe-
trated on public health authorities and the consuming public.
The eponymous papers of the book by University of California
Medical School professor Stanton Glantz and his colleagues are
internal industry memoranda from the files of Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corporation,"3 and their availability to litigators,
regulators and legislators is changing the nature of the debate
about the tobacco industry's accountability for the health of its
consumers. Excerpts from twenty-one of these documents were
introduced into evidence in the Carter trial, 4 and are likely to
have been at least partly responsible for the plaintiffs verdict in
that case. The FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco rests
to a degree on the analysis of key internal documents from the
industry. 5 Furthermore, the most dramatic scenes to date in
the history of the tobacco industry-the 1995 appearance by
executives of seven tobacco companies to testify under oath be-
fore a Congressional subcommittee chaired by Representative
Henry J. Waxman of California" and the subsequent solo ap-
pearance by the CEO of Brown & Williamson-were prompted
in large part by the legislators' access to the information in
these documents. 7
The Cigarette Papers is an expansion of an influential set of
articles published in the Journal of the American Medical Asso-
ciation in 1995 analyzing the contents of those memoranda. 8
Hilts was an early recipient of much of that same material, and
COVER-UP (1996).
12. STANTON A. GLANTz ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996).
13. See id. at 6-14.
14. See The Key Testimony, Court TV Trial Report (Carter v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.) (visited Aug. 8, 1996) <http-i/www.courttv.com/report> (printed copy
on file with author).
15. See FDA Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 44,847-5,150.
16. One writer described the image of "the 1994 lineup of seven chief executives
swearing . .. that they do not believe nicotine is addictive" as "a scene that defies
parody." Walter Goodman, Covering Tobacco: A Cautionary Tale, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1996, at C16.
17. HILTS, supra note 11, at 147-54.
18. See Stanton A. Glantz et al., Special Communications, 274 JAMA 219,219-53 (1995).
608 [Vol. 38:605
19971 TOBACCO.DEATHS 609
he broke the story of the industry's knowledge in his reports for
the New York Times.19 Smokescreen goes beyond the Brown &
Williamson memoranda, however, and incorporates Hilts's anal-
ysis of a good deal of the material developed in the Cipollone"
litigation as well as some material to which he had exclusive
access.
21
The most striking feature of the Brown & Williamson papers is
the stark contrast between the candor and scientific sophistica-
tion displayed within the industry and the denials and obfusca-
tion presented to the public by the industry. Presentations and
research proposals discussed at research conferences held by
Brown & Williamson's parent corporation, BAT Industries, for-
merly British American Tobacco, dealt with nicotine's addictive
properties, the carcinogenic and cardiopulmonary effects of ciga-
rette smoke, and the risks from environmental tobacco smoke, or
"passive smoking," well in advance of nonindustry parties' initial
publication of concerns and research findings about those mat-
ters.' Internal industry communications wholly contravene the
19. See, e.g., Philip J. Hilts, Cigarette Makers Debated the Risks They Denied, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1994, at Al; Philip J. Hilts, Method to Produce Safer Cigarette Was
Found in 60's, but Compiany Shelved Idea, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1994, at A20; Philip
J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Was Silent on Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at Al.
20. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. was originally filed in federal district court in
New Jersey on August 1, 1983. The case was subjected to a number of interlocutory
appeals. See, eg., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986) (in-
terlocutory appeal of a preemption ruling by district court). A four-month jury trial
resulted in a $400,000 verdict for the plaintiff on some of the claims that had been
asserted. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988) (deny.
ing all of the post-trial motions made by plaintiffs and defendants). Both sides ap-
pealed from the judgment entered on that verdict. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990). Nearly a decade after the case had been filed, the
United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld the viability of some of the legal
theories upon which Cipollone had been litigated, and remanded for further proceed-
ings. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The expense and
delay made it impossible for the plaintiffs (the children of the original plaintiffs,
both of whom had died during the litigation) and their attorney to continue. The
case is discussed at length in Kluger's book. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 639-77.
Hilts also characterizes the plaintiffs and their attorney as "folding" because of the
exhaustion produced by the 10 year litigation process that led up to the Supreme
Court decision. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 201.
21. See, e.g., HILTS, supra note 11, at 210-15 (describing exclusive early interviews
related to the development and test marketing of a "smokeless" cigarette developed
by the RJR tobacco company).
22. See GLANM ET AL., supra note 12, at 58-103 (discussing addiction); id. at 109-
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denials made throughout those periods to the public and to the
government agencies that had expressed concern about the
product's negative health effects.'
Were we ever as blind to the link between cigarette smoking
and health as the tobacco industry spokespeople would have had
us believe we should have been, at least until their legal self-in-
terest caused them to switch their position and assert that every-
one knew precisely what risky behavior they chose to adopt? The
term "coffin nails" appeared in American popular literature at
least three-quarters of a century prior to the 1964 report of the
United States Surgeon General that articulated the health effects
of smoking.' In Raymond Chandler's 1939 novel The Big Sleep,
detective Philip Marlowe, needing to pass time on a stakeout,
tells the reader that he "sat there and poisoned myself with ciga-
rette smoke.' 2m Common sense undoubtedly made the vast ma-
jority of smokers, as well as their family members, aware of the
connectioii between the impaired state of their health and their
indulgence in cigarette smoking.
Likely to have been missing throughout the relevant period,
however, was a smoker's appreciation of the extent of the harm
attributable to smoking and of smoking's addictive nature. A
smoker's lack of understanding, when combined with the
industry's knowledge of the full import of those facts, results in a
state of affairs that falls well short of any truly informed consent
by the average smoker to continue being exposed to the hazards of
smoking. For much of the time that the government and individu-
al smokers' own experiences were announcing that there was a
problem, the industry strongly resisted the existence of any such
link as more than speculative. This position adopted by the indus-
try further undermined the consuming population's appreciation
of the nature and the extent of associated health risks.
67 (discussing adverse health effects); i. at 393-410 (discussing passive smoking).
23. See id. at 100-05, 140, 154, 168-69, 413-16; HILTS, supra note 11, at 23-41, 144-74.
24. See 1 J.E. LIGHTER, RANDOM HOUSE HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
SLANG 451 (1994) (citing usage of the phrase "coffin nails" in the works of Bret Harte
(1873), 0. Henry (1906), Sinclair Lewis (1920), and John Dos Passos (1930), among
others). Partridge refers to its usage from around 1885. See ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DIC-
TIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH 237 (Paul Beale ed., 8th ed. 1984).
25. RAYMOND CHANDLER, The Big Sleep, in STORIES AND EARLY NOVELS 609 (1995).
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The Cigarette Paper's analysis of the Brown & Williamson
memoranda accuses the tobacco industry of "trying to have it
both ways: maintaining that there are no health dangers in
smoking but providing 'healthier' cigarettes to those people who
are worried about possible dangers." 6 Recent litigation pos-
tures assumed by the tobacco industry reveal that the convolut-
ed illogic of its position involves even more grotesque contor-
tions. If the tobacco industry is to be believed, smoking has not
been conclusively proven to be harmful; nicotine is not addictive;
and cigarette advertising is directed only at adults to influence
their brand preference. Because the dangers of cigarettes have
been known so well for so long, however, a person's decision to
begin or continue to smoke reflects a fully informed choice to
indulge in this nonaddictive, not-dangerous product.
In the words of H. Lee Sarokin, the federal district judge who,
by virtue of presiding over tobacco litigation for ten years, ac-
quired the clearest insight into the behavior of the tobacco
industry:
All too often in the choice between the physical health of con-
sumers and the financial well-being of business, concealment
is chosen over disclosure, sales over safety, and money over
morality. Who are these persons who knowingly and secretly
decide to put the buying public at risk solely for the purpose
of making profits and who believe that illness and death of
consumers is an appropriate cost of their own prosperity!
As the... facts disclose, despite some rising pretenders,
the tobacco industry may be the king of concealment and dis-
information....
... Plaintiff has presented .evidence from which a reason-
able jury could conclude that the tobacco industry in general,
and defendants in particular, were aware of the risks of
smoking; were concerned about the publication of those risks
by others and the consequent impact upon cigarette sales;
and sought to discredit or neutralize the adverse information
by proffering an independent research organization, the
Council for Tobacco Research (the "CTh"), which purportedly
would examine the risks of smoking and report its finding to
the public. The evidence presented by plaintiff supports a
26. GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 343.
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finding that the industry research which might indict smok-
ing as a cause of illness was diverted to secret research pro-
jects and that the publicized efforts were primarily directed
at finding causes other than smoking for the illnesses being
attributed to it. A jury might reasonably conclude that the
industry's announcement of proposed independent research
into the dangers of smoking and its promise to disclose its
findings was nothing but a public relations ploy-a fraud-to
deflect the growing evidence against the industry, to encour-
age smokers to continue and non-smokers to begin, and to
reassure the public that adverse information would be dis-
closed.'
The unequivocal message of that opinion led the appellate court
to remove Judge Saroldn from the litigation, citing the language
of the opinion as calling into question the appearance of the
judge's impartiality.'
27. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 683 (D.N.J.), vacated, 975 F.2d
81 (3d Cir. 1992).
28. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992). The court stated:
The district judge in this case has been a distinguished mem-
ber of the federal judiciary for almost 15 years and is no stranger
to this court; he is well known and respected for magnificent abil-
ities and outstanding jurisprudential and judicial temperament. On
the basis of our collective experience, we would not agree that he
is incapable of discharging judicial duties free from bias or preju-
dice. Unfortunately, that is not the test. It is not our subjective
impressions of his impartiality gleaned after reviewing his deci-
sions these many years; rather, the polestar is "[i]mpartiality and
the appearance of impartiality."
The final decision to be rendered by an eventual jury here is
whether petitioners, consisting of leading members of the tobacco
industry, conspired to withhold information concerning the dangers
of tobacco use from the general public. The plaintiffs seek to
prove that petitioners participated in an organized concealment of
potential health hazards. This, we repeat, is the ultimate issue to
be determined by a jury, as fact finders, after appropriate instruc-
tions given them by the trial judge.
Measured against these precepts, it is impossible for us to
vindicate the requirement of "appearance of impartiality" in view
of the statements made in the district court's prologue to its opin-
ion.... [Wie conclude that the appearance of impartiality will be
served only if an assignment to another judge is made, and we




Whatever one's view of the propriety of that opinion or its treat-
ment as grounds for removal," the strength of Judge Sarokin's
impression created by his immersion in the record of the tobacco
industry likely will be replicated by the reader who delves into
the three books reviewed here.
For the industry leaders to persist in their denials in the face
of such compelling evidence acknowledged by the industry in its
internal discussions is to display a willful ignorance that is but a
small step removed, if at all, from lying. Indeed, one of the phe-
nomena of the current tobacco scene is a proliferation of grand
jury investigations regarding whether the industry tactics sank
to the level of indictable fraud and perjury."°
These books do not limit their investigation of the deception of
the public to the tobacco industry proper; their scope also covers
professions a bit closer to home. All three books, but in particu-
lar those by Glantz et al. and Hilts, paint a picture of the role of
the legal profession in the affairs of the tobacco industry that is
disturbing, to say the least. The Cigarette Papers characterizes
this as perhaps "the most important insight" offered by the
Brown & Williamson papers,31 and the authors devote consider-
able attention to the topic.3 2 The line between providing legal
advice on company affairs and assuming a more hands-on direc-
tion of company activity can become blurred in many corporate
representation situations, particularly when tort liability for
that activity is a realistic prospect. The tobacco industry experi-
ence seems to be unique, however, in the way in which lawyers
played a dominant role in deciding how to direct or shut down
29. Kluger quotes the reaction of Professor Richard Daynard, head of the Tobacco
Products Liability Project at Northeastern University Law School, to Judge Sarokin's
removal: "He called it straight and did it in a way that was highly quotable. I had
always thought that one of the functions of judges was to show moral indigna-
tion.... ." KLUGER, supra note 6, at 677.
30. See, e.g., Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Convenes Grand Jury To Look at Tobacco Indus-
try, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at Al (reporting on a Justice Department probe of
tobacco industry); David Johnston, Federal Thrust Against Tobacco Gets New Vigor,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at Al (summarizing grand jury investigations in five
different cities into possible criminal violations by the tobacco industry).
31. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 437.
32. The authors' summary of the role of the lawyers, see id. at 437-40, is support-
ed by references and examples throughout the book.
1997] 613
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scientific research and in how research results should be com-
municated or buried."
No one would credibly claim that even as despicable a crea-
ture as Charles Manson, for example, should not have zealous
representation by a competent lawyer charged with a profession-
al responsibility to see that Mr. Manson received a fair trial and
that the state proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, adher-
ing to the relevant constitutional, procedural and evidentiary
requirements. One is likely to have a different reaction, howev-
er, to the notion of a lawyer on retainer to the Manson family,
charged.with the task of producing a "User's Manual for Helter
Skelter,"' in which the lawyer is not only explaining how to
avoid accountability for past criminality but also becoming even
more fully involved in planning the crimes to increase efficiency
and decrease detectability. The picture painted in the cigarette
books of the role played by some of the lawyers associated most
intimately with the tobacco industry comes alarmingly close to
that latter image.
One can read the corporate histories recounted in Kluger's
book and begin to feel some sense of admiration for the business
acumen of the people who piloted the industry leaders to their
unquestionable marketing success.35 One gets the impression,
confirmed by the stock market performance of the largest firms,
that many of these people were awfully good at what they did.
The books by Glantz et al. and Hilts, however, are likely to leave
one with an unqualified sense of outrage at the conclusion that
the industry was not just awfully good at what it did, but that
what it did was awful. The Hilts chapter on the use of tobacco
product advertising and the promotion of smoking to entice
teenagers and pre-teens into smoking is especially powerful,"
and it reminds the reader that success in the cigarette business
means addicting more children than one's competitors. When
one accounts for all the evidence set out in these books, the
33. See id. at 288-338; KLUGER, supra note 6, at 359-64, 479-80.
34. See VINCENT BUGLIOSI & CURT GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER: THE TRUE STORY
OF THE MANSON MURDERS (1974).
35. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 6, at 292-97 (describing the origin and success of
Philip Morris's Marlboro Man advertising campaign).
36. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 63-101.
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realization remains that admiring the tobacco industry for its
marketing success is like congratulating the German railroads
for lowering the cost per passenger-mile of transporting people
to the death camps.
The health of the smoking public and the health of the body
politic may be equally implicated in our reaction to the posture
taken by the industry since the first evidence of smoking-related
illness began to surface. Suspicion in spite of unremitting deni-
als by the industry can breed public cynicism; knowledge of the
cynical exploitation of the public can provoke action. At some
point in public discourse, there can be no escape from the conse-
quence of knowing. These three books on the state of the
industry's knowledge of the health effects of smoking lay out a
powerful case for the proposition that we have passed that point
of knowing and thus action of some sort inevitably must follow.
Generating optimism about the wisdom of such action is diffi-
cult, however, if one draws exclusively on the historical intransi-
gence of the tobacco industry and the ineffectiveness of almost
all of the efforts of the legal system up to this point. The re-
mainder of this Review Essay examines a number of important
developments that offer promise for breaking out of the con-
straints within which the legal system has traditionally ap-
proached at the issues surrounding the relationship between
tobacco and health.
I. THE CHANGING FACE OF THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
After a decades-long legal record of undistinguished and incre-
mental action providing imperfect protection to the public
health, the developments regarding smoking and health in the
last couple of years have occurred almost faster than one can
follow. Until the middle of this decade, the truly noteworthy in-
terventions by the legal system could be counted on one hand:
the authorization and annual publication of the Surgeon
General's report on smoking,"7 the warning labels required by
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1994) (requiring an annual report by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services on "current information on the health consequences of
smoking" and recommendations for legislation deemed appropriate by the Secretary).
Kiuger describes this as "a provision, thought to be harmless by the industry's law-
1997] 615
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the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,"5 as subse-
quently amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969"9 and the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act,4" the
ban on cigarette advertising on broadcast media,4 and a vari-
ety of provisions adopted at the federal, state, and local levels
prohibiting smoking in some locations.42
Even those few interventions did not necessarily produce a
positive result for public health. For example, the 1992 Supreme
Court decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.4" applied the
doctrine of federal preemption to the federal statutes requiring
warning labels in such a way as to conclude that common law
claims for damages were preempted if they were based on an
assertion that the tobacco manufacturers should have said some-
thing in their advertising or promotion that differed from what
the statute required." As a result of this ruling, the required
yers," KLUGER, supra note 6, at 291, thrown in as a concession to the Federal Trade
Commission and the (then) Department of Health, Education and Welfare, agencies
that were being deprived by the legislation of jurisdiction over cigarette labeling and
advertising. See id. "That sop to the two agencies," KIuger concludes, "would in time
help turn smoking into a pressing public issue." Id.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1333.
39. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340).
40. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 99
1331-1333, 1335a-1337 & 1341 (1994)).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335.
42. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 270, § 22 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (regulating
smoking in public places (first adopted in 1987); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o
(Consol. Supp. 1996) (codifying indoor smoking restrictions). This measure was first
enacted in 1975. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o for municipal efforts at set-
ting restrictions on smoking dates back to 1983-the date of the passage of an influ-
ential San Francisco referendum, Proposition P, ratifying an ordinance requiring non-
smoking areas in workplaces. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 251, 431.
At the federal level, the legislation banning smoking on domestic airline flights
is probably the most noteworthy smoking restriction development so far. See 49
U.S.C. § 41,706 (1994). Both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration had entered the arena of smoking and
health by 1994, demonstrating concern about the effects of environmental tobacco
smoke and beginning the process of regulatory action. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at
737-40; see also Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Indoor Air Quality,
59 Fed. Reg. 15,968 (1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926 &
1928) (providing notice of proposed rulemaking for regulation of workplace air quali-
ty, including environmental tobacco smoke).
43. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
44. See id. at 524.
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warnings- on cigarette packages and in advertising have pro-
tected the industry from legal accountability not only for failing
to provide stronger warnings45 but also for public relations and
marketing efforts that directly and effectively undermined the
message of the federally mandated warning labels.46
Similarly, the tobacco industry viewed the federal ban on
broadcast advertising of cigarettes as beneficial in two ways.
First, the ban eliminated the anti-smoking commercials required
by the Fairness Doctrine then in effect under the rules of the
Federal Communications Act.47 Second, the ban allowed the in-
dustry to forego the most expensive advertising medium, leading
to lower advertising costs but not lower prices, and thus increas-
ing the profits to the firms, all of this occurring with no appre-
ciable reduction in product demand.48
Looking at the current legal landscape, however, one finds
half a dozen developments that deserve attention as the legal
system struggles not only with the question of social consensus
concerning smoking and health issues but also with the implica-
tions of the compelling evidence of more than thirty years of in-
dustry concealment of what was known internally and denied
publicly. If it is not too simplistic a notion to see one of the func-
tions of the legal system as providing a fix for what is broken in
the larger social arena, then the current legal developments
might be divided into two categories: one set of legal responses
that have at their heart an attempt to "fix" blame, and the other
consisting essentially of efforts to "fix" the problem.
The first set, which adapts tort litigation models to the tobac-
co industry scenario, is primarily retrospective in nature. This
category comprises developments in (1) traditional tort litigation
by or on behalf of individual smokers seeking damages for per-
45. See id. at 524-25.
46. See id. at 527-28.
47. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 332-35 (chronicling Congress's imposition of the
ban on broadcast advertising of cigarettes). For a detailed discussion of the Fairness
Doctrine, see JOHN THORNE ET AL., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW 307-12 (1995). See
also KLUGER, supra note 6, at 304-10 (discussing the imposition of the Fairness Doc-
trine to broadcast advertising of cigarettes, reqdiring anti-smoking ads).
48. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 258; KLUGER, supra note 6, at 377 (stat-
ing that per capita cigarette sales to adults increased in the first three years after
the broadcast ban took effect).
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sonal injury or death,49 (2) class action, mass tort litigation on
behalf of large groups of smokers or those affected by the smok-
ing of others to which they could not help but be exposed,"0 and
(3) litigation brought by public officials to recoup from the tobac-
co industry some of the public expense attributable to use of the
industry's products. "
The second set of developments, employing legislative and
regulatory techniques, is more prospective in nature, starting
with the development of an accurate understanding of where we
are and then trying to create responsible programs designed to
lead to a better future. Included in this second set are efforts to
regulate, by legislation or administrative rule, (1) the informa-
tion that is available and communicated about tobacco,52 (2) the
access of children to tobacco products, 53 and (3) the content of
those products.'
Each of these developments, on its own, merits an article or
more. The following discussion offers a brief summary of each
technique for coming to grips with the tobacco and health problem
and provides the grounds for a somewhat pessimistic assessment
of each development's prospects, at least as things now stand.
A Individual Smoker Litigation
Products liability claims asserted by individual smokers seek-
ing damages from tobacco companies constitute one of the more
discouraging personal injury litigation sagas of the last forty
years.' By mid-summer of 1996, damages had been awarded to
49. See infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
55. The story of litigation brought against the tobacco industry until the beginning
of this decade is recounted in Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco
Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992). Professor Rabin concludes his article
with the observation that "tlort law and tort process seem to conspire against any
effective role for the tobacco litigant," id. at 878, but he views the individual rights
perspective of tort litigation as leading to a generally less promising line of endeavor
than a public health perspective supporting legislative and regulatory action. See id.
at 876.
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plaintiffs in only two cases, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.6"
and Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,57 that chal-
lenged a "normal" cigarette as a dangerously defective prod-
uct.8 The $400,000 award by the jury in Cipollone was set
aside on appeal, 9 and the plaintiffs and their attorney were
unwilling to extend the litigation effort into a new trial testing
the legal theories that the courts held were still available to
them." The $750,000 award to the Carters in August 19961
also faces the hazards of the appellate process before it may
solidly assume the posture that the plaintiffs' bar would assign
to it, as the initial swell of the wave of the future." Indeed,
only two weeks after the verdict for the plaintiffs in Carter, an
Indiana case resulted in a defense verdict.'
The admissibility into evidence of documents from the files of
Brown & Williamson will certainly be among the issues contest-
ed on appeal in Carter. An important part of the history recount-
ed in these books is the effort by the industry to shield from
discovery much of its internal workings, including the results of
56. See supra note 20.
57. No. 95-00934 CA (Fla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 1996).
58. A third plaintiff also has received an award of damages from a tobacco com-
pany, but this occurred under an unusual set of circumstances. For a brief period
during the 1950s, P. Lorillard manufactured the Kent brand of cigarettes with a
"Micronite" filter containing asbestos fibers. See, e.g., Lesnick v. Hollingsworth &
Vase Co., 35 F.3d 939, 940 (4th Cir. 1994). Some of the smokers of those cigarettes
have alleged that their lung cancers were caused not by the tobacco smoke but by
the inhalation of asbestos from the filter. See id. In 1995, a San Francisco jury re-
turned a verdict of $1.3 million in compensatory damages and $700,000 in punitive
damages to the plaintiffs in Horowitz v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., the first of the
"Micronite Filter" cases in which plaintiffs were successful. See California Jury
Awards Smoker $2 Million for Cancer from 'Micronite' Cigarette Filter, 23 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 961 (1995). These cases are obviously a very small sub-
set of the total population of actual and potential claims by cigarette smokers.
59. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
60. See supra note 20.
61. See No. 95-00934 CA (Fla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 1996).
62. See, e.g., Ravo, supra note 5, at Al (quoting Mr. Carter's lawyer, Norwood
Wilner, as stating that the victory in that case "means that private citizens that are
injured by products made by tobacco companies can seek redress in the courts across
the country ... and succeed.... We proved the cigarette industry is not above the
law. This is a wake-up call").
63. See Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA)
798 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1996).
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research performed by, or under the sponsorship of, the indus-
try.' Although the industry has stretched beyond any plausi-
bility claims that these documents are protected by the work
product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege,' the defense
is likely to engage in a document-by-document challenge to ad-
missibility on just such grounds and additionally to challenge
the relevance of particular documents to specific defendants.
Cipollone's federal preemption holding also could contribute
significantly to the rocky passage that a tobacco litigation
plaintiffs verdict must traverse on appeal. With the Cipollone
ruling rendering significant portions of post-1969 tobacco compa-
ny behavior unavailable to plaintiffs as a basis of liability,' the
relationship between the harm to any individual plaintiff and
the conduct of the tobacco company that can legitimately serve
as a basis of liability becomes more attenuated. One would
think, for example, that causation becomes a very complicated
legal issue when a smoker's cancer manifests itself long after
the federally mandated warnings began to provide protection for
the industry from warnings-based claims. The timeliness of
claims that are based upon pre-1969 conduct of the industry of-
fers still another avenue of attack on a judgment entered on a
verdict for the plaintiff in individual smoker litigaiton.
At the present time, plaintiffs must still consider success in
individual smoker litigation to be a long shot. A number of
states have enacted legislation that sets up barriers to recovery
on a products liability theory.67 Even without such legislation,
persuasively putting the liability theory before a trier of fact can
be difficult.
A significant part of the doctrinal problem with smoking-relat-
ed claims lies with the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of
64. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 235-41; HILTS, supra note 11, at 197-
200; KLUGER, supra note 6, at 653-54.
65. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 235-41.
66. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1996) (stating that there is
no liability for an inherently unsafe common consumer product, such as tobacco,
known to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-3(a)(2)
(West 1987) (stating that there is no liability on a design defect theory if a harm is




Torts. At the same time that the American Law Institute made
its breakthrough articulation of a generally applicable doctrine
of strict tort liability for defective products, the Institute ex-
pressly observed in the comments that cigarettes were not un-
reasonably dangerous defective products.' Although that com-
ment may reflect the social mores of the time and the predilec-
tions of the drafters, the subsequent history of products liability
litigation in other areas69 supports the view that legal doctrines
are capable of evolving as the scientific evidence of a link be-
tween "good tobacco" and health effects has become irrefutable.
At a more fundamental level, however, the Restatement com-
ment reflects the conceptual confusion created by the need to
reconcile a liability doctrine that employs a category of defective
products with a class of products that are best understood as
lethal, that is, that are deadly when used in precisely the way
they are intended to be used.
The information contained in the Brown & Williamson papers,
along with whatever further revelations come from elsewhere in
the industry,0 may provide enough of a change in the litigation
dynamics to increase appreciably the industry's risk of losing
individual smoker lawsuits. In its public relations release re-
garding the American Medical Association's plans to publish ar-
ticles analyzing the Brown & Williamson papers, a company
statement included the following passage:
Brown & Williamson would hope to achieve a fair hearing in
the court of public opinion. However, based on continued one-
sided presentation of the issues, the company will continue to
rely on the legal system, where the facts are presented in an
impartial manner and decided by impartial juries.7
If Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.72 should
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) ("Good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful.").
69. See, e.g., infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing the history of
tort litigation regarding asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and breast implants).
70. See, e.g., Chip Jones, Ex-Tobacco Employees Face More Questions, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 20, 1996, at Al (reporting on the affidavits of three former
Philip Morris employees: two researchers, and a plant shift supervisor).
71. GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 444.
72. No. 95-00934 CA (Fla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 1996).
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emerge from the appellate process as the wave of the future
rather than as one aberrational plaintiff victory in a sea of loss-
es, the tobacco industry may very well come to rue the attitude
that those words convey.
Nevertheless, even if the momentum in tobacco litigation
shifts from the industry to the plaintiffs, the prospect of repeat-
ed and larger verdicts for plaintiffs does not necessarily lead to a
future that embodies sound social policy. The tobacco industry is
not the first segment of the United States economy to be subject-
ed to the tort litigation process in such a manner. One of the
significant features of mass tort litigation in the last thirty years
has been the emergence of a cycle faced by a number of indus-
tries or firms. From an early position of defense-dominated liti-
gation, the cycle runs through some isolated litigation losses, to
the availability of a sufficient body of evidence of highly culpable
conduct to support punitive damages awards, and ultimately to
a retreat to the safe harbor of bankruptcy law to protect against
the massive liability that looms on the litigation horizon. That
precise cycle has played itself out with asbestos," with the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device of the A.H. Robins Compa-
ny, 7 4 and most recently with the silicone gel breast implants of
the Dow Corning Corporation.75
The message of Carter, viewed against the backdrop of this
mass harm litigation cycle, may satisfy those who win early in
the litigation process, but it certainly is not likely to produce
compensation in any realistic approximation of the harm that
actually can be attributed to the tobacco industry. Individual
smoker tort litigation is ill-suited to providing an effective and
rational resolution of the problem of tobacco and health when
73. See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT. THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY
ON TRIAL (1985).
74. See, e.g., RONALD J. BACIGAL, THE LIMITS OF LTIGATIoN: THE DALKON SHIELD
CONTROVERSY (1990); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
75. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996) (resolving the issue
of the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over claims against parties other than
Dow Corning); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 94-p-11558-
5, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (approving the settlement




viewed from a broad social perspective, and when one seeks a
solution that looks forward as well as back.
B. Class Action Litigation
The clearest lesson of the tobacco industry's response to the
products liability litigation filed by individual smokers is that
industry members will incur whatever expense necessary to de-
feat each and every claim.7" Kluger reports that the defense of
the Cipollone case was estimated to cost between thirty and fifty
million dollars.77 A large part of that cost included paying for
litigation tactics that drove up the plaintiffs cost, thereby add-
ing to the disincentive for individual plaintiffs to take on the
industry. The cost of the plaintiffs' case in Cipollone was nearly
three million dollars, and that substantial investment only got
the case to a point at which it was ready to be taken back to a
trial court after remand from the United States Supreme Court's
ruling that some of the claims, that had been asserted were not
preempted by the federal labeling legislation.78
Given the enormous costs that individual plaintiffs face, it is
not surprising that attention has turned to the use of class ac-
tion litigation as a way to level the playing field for the contest
between plaintiffs and the tobacco industry. Two types of class
action litigation, distinguished by the nature of the plaintiffs,
are worth noting in the current legal landscape. In one type of
litigation, the plaintiff class consists of smokers, while in the
other, the plaintiffs represent classes of people who have been
exposed to the effects of smoking by others.
76. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 196-97. This unyielding posture is what adds to
the significance of the recent settlement of the claims against the Liggett Group, the
smallest of the tobacco firms. See Liggett Group Settles Suits by Five States Seeking
Reimbursement for Medicaid Costs, [Current Reports, Jan.-June] 24 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) 281 (Mar. 22, 1996); Liggett Settles Liability Suit in 'Castano;
Agreement Near in State Reimbursement Suits, [Current Reports, Jan.-June] 24 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 233 (Mar. 15, 1996). Although the settlement amounts
may not be substantial when compared to the potential liability of the rest of the
industry, this does open the door to obtaining additional information about the in-
dustry and creates the possibility of an adversarial posture between the Liggett
Group and the rest of the industry.
77. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 674.
78. See id. at 674-75.
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What appeared to be the 800-pound gorilla of the smoker class
action litigation, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,79 was origi-
nally filed in March 1993 with three named plaintiffs-two
smokers and one widow of a smoker." The named defendants
were seven tobacco companies and their various affiliated com-
panies, plus the Tobacco Institute."l The major significance of
the Castano litigation was its pooling of the resources and the
efforts of the plaintiffs' bar so that they could take on the well-
funded industry's defense.82
The prospects for this litigation strategy received an initial
boost when the federal district court certified a plaintiff class
consisting of all nicotine-dependent persons who had purchased
and used cigarettes manufactured by the defendants, their
spouses, children, relatives, and "significant others" as heirs or
survivors, and the personal representatives of deceased smokers
who* were nicotine-dependent.' The air was let out of the
Castano balloon, however, when the class certification order was
reversed on appeal.'
The court of appeals held that "class treatment is not superior
to individual adjudication" and expressed a preference for the
"collective wisdom of individual juries... before this court com-
mits the fate of an entire industry or, indeed, the fate of a class
of millions, to a* single jury."' Coming less than two weeks af-
ter another court of appeals had rejected the relaxation of class
action prerequisites when a plaintiff class in an asbestos case
had been certified for the purpose of settlement rather than
litigation,86 the ruling in Castano casts a substantial pall on
the prospect of mass tort litigation of individual smoker claims.
After the failure to sustain a national class action at the federal
79. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995) (granting in
part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for class certification), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734
(5th Cir. 1996).
80. See id. at 548.
81. See id.
82. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 203.
83. See Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 548, 560.
84. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 752.
86. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996).
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level, the next round of litigation in this vein attempts to recon-
stitute the smoker classes at the level of individual states.87
The most noteworthy of the class action lawsuits so far in the
environmental tobacco smoke (passive smoking) category is the
claim being litigated on behalf of airline flight attendants ex-
posed to the recirculated cigarette smoke prior to the banning of
smoking on domestic airline flights. That action, Broin v. Philip
Morris Cos.,8 was filed in state court in Florida in 1991.9 The
trial court originally dismissed the class action allegations stat-
ed in the complaint, but that ruling was reversed on appeal. The
trial court then certified a class consisting of "[aill nonsmoking
flight attendants who are or have been employed by airlines
based in the United States and are suffering from diseases and
disorders caused by their exposure to second hand cigarette
smoke in airline cabins." Appellate challenges by the defense
to that class certification failed,9' and by the summer of 1996
the case was ready to proceed as a class action litigation.
What remains to be seen, of course, is whether a convincing
case can be constructed to establish the link between the expo-
sure to the toxic by-products of other people's cigarettes and
whatever specific harms that the plaintiff class members allege.
On that point, the mass tort litigation cycle referred to above 2
may be at an earlier stage in the passive smoking litigation than
it is in smoker litigation. Although there is sufficient evidence
for the federal government to have begun the regulatory pro-
cess,93 the tobacco industry has adopted in full trumpet the
87. See Plaintiffs File Suits Against Tobacco Makers in New York, Louisiana, Dis-
trict of Columbia, [Current Reports, Jan.-June] 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA)
593 (June 28, 1996); Three State Class Actions Filed in Wake of 'Castano' Decertifica-
tion, [Current Reports, Jan.-June] 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 519 (June 5,
1996) (describing actions filed in Louisiana, Maryland, and New Mexico).
88. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), rev. denied, 654 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1995).
89. See Flight Attendants File $5 Billion Action, Contend Passengers' Smoke
Caused Ailments, 19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1247 (Nov. 8, 1991).
90. Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 91-49738 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 1994) (order
granting motion for class certification) (visited Sept. 12, 1996) <http'l/www.courttv.
comlibrary/business/tobacco/broin.html>.
91. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Broin, 672 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per
curiam), rev. dismissed, 676 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1996).
92. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
93. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 690.
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same cry of "not proved"' that it employed so misleadingly for
many years regarding the connection between smoking and dis-
ease. 5 The stakes for the tobacco industry in this type of litiga-
tion may be considerably higher than for direct smoking claims,
given the industry's reduced ability in these cases to blame the
victims for deciding to be exposed to the risk.'
C. Attorney General Litigation
Another technique being employed to accommodate the imper-
fect fit between tobacco and health litigation and the parameters
of traditional tort litigation is the initiation of lawsuits by state
attorneys general against the tobacco industry. The key element
of these actions is the claim for reimbursement of expenses in-
curred by the state for treatment of tobacco-related harm. By the
end of September of 1996, sixteen of these lawsuits had been
filed, 7 and more can be expected to follow.
Although the process of litigating these claims has begun
quite recently, the issues raised already have received some ap-
pellate attention. Two rulings are particularly noteworthy.
The Supreme Court of Florida recently had occasion to consid-
er an intermediate appellate court's ruling that the legislation
authorizing the state to sue the tobacco companies, the Medicaid
94. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 106-07.
95. See id. at 12-17.
96. See id. at 105-06.
97. See Latest Reimbursement Suit Names Law Firms As Defendants, Alleges
Fraud and Conspiracy, [Current Reports] 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 817-18
(Sept. 6, 1996). Since Mississippi filed the first suit of this type in 1994, 15 other
states have taken similar action, including two states that filed late in Septeber. See
id. The other states that have filed suit are Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. See id. Similar claims have been filed
at the local level by authorities in New York, San Francisco, San Jose, and Los
Angeles counties. See N.Y. Lawsuit Attacks Tobacco Research Front Groups, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 1997, at A6.
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Third-Party Liability Act,9" was unconstitutional." The court
upheld the facial constitutionality of the legislation but ruled
that the defendants were free to raise challenges to the constitu-
tionality of the act as applied during later stages of the litigation
process.00 In a more damaging blow to the prospects for Flori-
da recovering damages from the tobacco companies in order to
recoup its Medicaid expenses, the court found to be violative of
due process a statutory provision that relieved the state of its
obligation to identify individual Medicaid recipients whose medi-
cal expenses were smoking-related.101
The attempt to stretch a standard third-party liability rule to
cover the peculiar circumstances of tobacco-related health prob-
lems illustrates the conceptual problem inherent in this kind of
litigation. In the normal state of affairs, the party who pays for
medical treatment steps into the shoes of the injured person for
the purpose of pursuing a subrogation claim against the third
party who was responsible for the harm. The claims by the state
attorneys general instead try.to create a class-based subrogation
right that is comparable to the innovative settlement class
treatment afforded to the veterans in the Agent Orange litiga-
tion.0 2 In that case, Vietnam veterans claimed that exposure
to Agent Orange had caused a variety of medical ailments.0 3
Although it might have been possible to conclude that the class
as a whole had suffered harm, it likely would not have been
possible to prove that a specific individual's harm was related to
that exposure. '" The class action litigation device enabled fed-
eral district Judge Jack B. Weinstein to approve a settlement
fashioning relief that reflected the harm to the class as a whole.0"
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West Supp. 1996). Although the legislation on its
face applies to all situations in which a third party acted in a way that caused the
state to incur Medicaid obligations, the governor issued an executive order limiting
the use of the statute to claims against the tobacco industry. See Agency for Health
Care Admin. v. Associated Indus., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1246 (1996).
99. See Associated Industries, 678 So. 2d at 1243.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(approving settlement following fairness hearings), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
103. See id. at 775-87.
104. See id. at 833-37.
105. See id. at 837-43, 857-62. Judge Weinstein's reflections on the lessons of this
1997] 627
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Adopting doctrinal or procedural stances that try to cram
these cases back into the confines of traditional tort litigation
could sound the death knell for this legal development. It is not
at all unlikely that a requirement for individual identification of
Medicaid patients could increase the administrative costs of pur-
suing this reimbursement strategy beyond what a state would be
willing to pay.
Legislation adopted in 1996 in Virginia constructed a similar-
ly daunting doctrinal hurdle."6 This amendment to the Medic-
aid reimbursement statute requires that any Medicaid reim-
bursement litigation "shall be decided under the same laws,
rules and standards including applicable bases of liability and
defenses as would apply if the individual receiving the services
had brought the action directly."' 7 As with the Florida deci-
sion regarding identification of Medicaid patients who received
health care for smoking-related illnesses, the Virginia legislation
attempts to enforce the application of traditional subrogation
and third-party liability notions in this litigation setting, and
serves as an effective brake on any attempt to recoup sub-
stantial sums from the tobacco industry."8
The other appellate decision that offers valuable insight into
the health care cost reimbursement cause of action dealt with an
attempt by a private insurer to piggy-back on the state claim to
recover damages from the tobacco industry for its Medicaid pay-
ments. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the course of up-
holding the claim on behalf of the state, recently held that a pri-
vate health insurer lacked standing to pursue tort remedies from
the tobacco industry for the additional health care costs it was
required to meet as a result of smoking-related harm to its poli-
cyholders.' 9 The court allowed the private insurer to proceed
and other mass tort cases can be found in JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE
IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND
OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995).
106. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-325.2(D) (Michie Supp. 1996).
107. Id.
108. The brake metaphor is admittedly incongruous in a state as committed to the
tobacco industry as Virginia. Reality is more accurately captured by an image of ap-
plying the brakes in a pick-up truck that has been mounted on concrete blocks and
had its wheels removed.
109. See Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn. 1996).
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with its statutory antitrust and consumer protection claims,"'
but the relationship between the insurer's obligation to pay for
smoking-related health care and the conduct of the tobacco in-
dustry was held to be too remote to support- an industry duty en-
forceable by tort damages that extended to the insurer."'
Limiting the scope of the attorney general lawsuits to the re-
covery of health care expenditures that have been made from
public funds may be justifiable as a matter of current tort doc-
trine, but it results in an unfortunate assignment of a higher
priority to the recovery of health care costs that have been
spread over a tax base than to the same category of costs when
they are spread over a private insurance base. As described be-
low, a proposed modification of legislation enacted by a few
states to shift some of the costs of smoking to tobacco companies
can expand the reach of the cost-allocation idea underlying these
actions on behalf of the states and accomplish much the same
goal through another method.
D. Information Regulation
The cigarette trade has featured government-mandated warn-
ings since 1965, when Congress enacted the first such require-
ment."2 Instead of acting as a meaningful public health mea-
sure, the required warning label probably is viewed more realis-
tically as the single most effective insulation against liability to
smokers that the tobacco companies have been able to obtain."3
Information requirements that surpass current federal label-
ing requirements can easily be justified. The most glaring omis-
sion from the warnings currently required is any reference to
the addictive nature of nicotine." 4 If the warnings legitimately
110. See id- 495-97.
111. See id. at 493-95.
112. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994)).
113. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 255-56, 342. Hilts quotes from a docu-
ment in which lawyers for Brown & Williamson and British American Tobacco Com-
pany speculate that the litigation posture of the industry would be well served by
issuing or acquiescing to warnings before the government acted to require them. See
HILTS, supra note 11, at 35.
114. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 547-48 (describing lobbying efforts by the tobac-
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are expected to produce a public health benefit, one surely would
think that the probability of addiction is an essential part of the
message that should be communicated.
Information about cigarette additives is another issue on
which regulatory attention might be focused more clearly in or-
der to reduce the adverse health effects of smoking. Congress
enacted legislation in 1984 requiring tobacco companies to file
reports on what additives were used, but, at the same time, it
required that the information be kept confidential and thus the
reports could not be used in any meaningful way."5 More effec-
tive efforts to make use of the information about additions may
occur at the state level. The Massachusetts legislature, for ex-
ample, enacted a statute in 1996 requiring the manufacturers of
tobacco products to provide information about the contents of
their products to the state Department of Public Health."6
This statute requires manufacturers to report, beginning in
1997, the identity of any added constituent, in rank order by
weight or volume." 7 The legislation's concession to the trade
secret argument set forth by the industry is that it does not
require the disclosure of the actual amount of any such constitu-
ent that has been designated as safe when burned."' The leg-
islation also requires the reporting of the nicotine yield of the
product but states that the report is to be based on standards
that will be established by the Department of Public Health."'
That provision is potentially significant because of the growing
dissatisfaction with the way that the Federal Trade
Commission's nicotine measurement methods understate the
impact that the nicotine content actually produces, given the
way that smokers really consume the product.' Because the
statute does not require the information to become part of the
co industry to resist inclusion of addiction notice among the rotating warnings in the
1984 amendment to the labeling act).
115. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 7, 98 Stat.
2203 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1335a (1994)).
116. See 1996 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 234 (S.B. 2191), available in WESTLAW, MA-




120. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 452-55.
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product labeling or advertising, Cipollone's federal preemption
ruling should not bar the state from forcing this method of dis-
closure of this information. 1
This legislative development and possible dissemination of
information about the elements other than tobacco that are in-
cluded in tobacco products may prove to have its greatest signifi-
cance in undercutting the central premise of the standard tort
doctrine that cigarettes are not defective.1" Preliminary indica-
tions from the tobacco companies' partial disclosure of the re-
ports made under the federal legislation reveal that substantial
numbers of carcinogens are added to tobacco products.m To
the extent that "good tobacco""2 is thought not to be unreason-
ably dangerous, the revelation of the carcinogenic substances
that end up in cigarettes and other tobacco products could lead
to a realization that "good tobacco" is a thing of the past, and
that current industry practices result in a highly adulterated
and processed product.' The chief limitation on the utility of
this disclosure of information for tort litigation purposes is es-
tablishing that any specific substance is present in sufficient
amounts to be dangerous to health.
E. Access Regulation
All three of the books reviewed here provide compelling evi-
dence that the commercial success of the tobacco industry de-
pends on acquiring a consumer base in the population that is too
young to smoke legally.' The FDA has taken the lead role in
blocking industry efforts to lure young people into smoking, by
pursuing measures to regulate the distribution of tobacco prod-
121. The preemption holding in Cipollone does not apply to "a state law duty to
disclose . . . facts through channels of communication other than advertising or pro-
motion ... [as] for example, if state law obliged respondents [tobacco companies] to
disclose material facts about smoking and health to an administrative agency."
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 528 (1992).
122. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
123. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 201-33.
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
125. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 57-62 (describing the adulteration of the ciga-
rette).
126. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 249; HILTS, supra note 11, at 63-101;
KLUER, supra note 6, at 445-46, 700-03.
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ucts to children. 27 Among the measures in the FDA's regula-
tion is a prohibition on the sale or distribution of tobacco prod-
ucts to children under the age of eighteen. 2 ' The FDA rule re-
inforces the effectiveness of that age limit by imposing a require-
ment that sales take place in a face-to-face transaction rather
than through such devices as vending machines."9 The regula-
tion also restricts the promotional activities of tobacco compa-
nies30 and limits their advertising to text-only formats in print
media that have a significant readership among young peo-
ple. '3 A provision in the proposed rule to require tobacco com-
panies to spend at least $150 million a year to maintain educa-
tional programs and to purchase television advertising to dis-
courage young people from smoking was not included in the
final rule.'32
At the heart of the FDA effort is the conceptual decision by
then-Commissioner David A. Kessler, a pediatrician, to treat the
prevention of smoking as a matter of pediatric medicine."$ Fol-
lowing that strategy, the FDA's rules are intended to make it
more difficult and less attractive for people to smoke at the
young age when almost all smokers begin to do so. On the day
that the White House announced the FDA measure in 1995, and
the day before the FDA actually published its notice of proposed
rulemaking, tobacco companies brought a suit in federal court in
North Carolina to block the rulemaking effort."
Measures to restrict juveniles' access to tobacco products that
they are prohibited by law from purchasing have been enacted
at the state level prior to the FDA proposal to federalize this
type of smoking prevention effort.'35 Hilts is quite critical of
127. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smoke-
less Tobacco Products To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396
(1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820 & 897).
128. See id. at 44,616-17.
129. See id. at 44,616.
130. See id. at 44,616-18.
131. See id. at 44,617.
132. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,374 (1995).
133. See Jeffrey Goldberg, Next Target: Nicotine, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 4, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 7518074.
134. Coyne Beahm Inc. v. FDA, No. 2:95CV00591 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1995).
135. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.2 (Michie 1996) (prohibiting, inter alia, the
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the tobacco companies' attempts to influence state legislatures,
citing the companies' efforts to lobby for low fines and the autho-
rization of law enforcement rather than more motivated public
health officials to issue citations.136
Even stronger measures regulating juveniles' access to tobacco
products have been enacted at the local level. An example is the
ordinance adopted by the City Council of the City of New York
in 1990, prohibiting the sale of tobacco products from vending
machines in many locations, setting fines of up to $1000, and
making cigarette license suspension a risk of violating the ordi-
nance.137 When the ordinance was challenged by firms engaged
in the vending machine business, the Court of Appeals held that
more lenient legislation adopted at the state level did not pre-
empt the more stringent (and likely more effective) municipal
legislation."'
F. Content Regulation
The most dramatic of the regulatory initiatives on smoking
and health would be an aggressive follow through to the asser-
tion that cigarettes need to be understood as devices for the de-
livery of a drug.3 ' If the implications of that characterization
were fully applied to cigarettes, then the FDA arguably would be
required to go beyond regulation of child access to tobacco prod-
ucts and instead carry out its statutory mandate to approve the
safety and the efficacy of drugs and medical devices. 40
sale of tobacco products to, and possession by, persons under 18 years of age, the
sale of cigarettes outside of the manufacturer's package, and the sale of tobacco
products in vending machines to which children are likely to have access without
the seller being aware).
136. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 91-92, 100. The Virginia statute described in the
preceding footnote, for example, sets a fine of $50 for an initial violation of the pro-
hibition on sales to minors, rising to $250 for a third offense. See VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-371.2(D). It also refers to summons being issued by "any law enforcement officer,"
and does not mention public health officials. Id. The provision also states that there is
no private cause of action created by the statute. See id. § 18.2-371.2(F).
137. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADmIN. CODE § 17-177.
138. See Vatore v. Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, 634 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 1994).
139. See FDA Jurisdiction, supra note 3.
140. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
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II. THE CURRENT ENViRONMENT
As this Review Essay was completed, the FDA had issued a
final rule embodying many of the regulations that had been of-
fered for notice and comment in August 1995,141 and a Florida
jury has awarded plaintiffs a verdict of three-quarters of a mil-
lion dollars in damages in a smoking-related harm case." It is
thus possible to describe both the regulatory picture and the
litigation picture as being on the verge of massive change from
the status quo under which the tobacco industry operated for so
many years with legal impunity and indifference. And yet...
It is just as possible to describe the regulatory and litigation
pictures as offering aberrational movements before sliding back
into what has come to be the normal, static refusal by legisla-
tures, courts, and the tobacco industry to make meaningful ef-
forts to deal with the health effects of tobacco products. Fore-
casting is even less exact for legal change than it is for the
weather, but by the end of the decade, we might look back at a
legal climate in which Carter was reversed on appeal and the
disposition of other cases was more in line with the string of
victories won by the industry lawyers.
We might also look back at a legal climate in which the FDA
generally lost its jurisdiction over tobacco or had its specific
measures struck down by the courts. Whatever the ultimate out-
come of the judicial consideration of the agency's jurisdiction and
of any action that the agency eventually takes pursuant to that
jurisdiction, the history of the smoking and health problem in
this country leaves little room for optimism that the regulatory
route offers much promise. The tobacco industry is so influential
in Congress, 4 3 and tobacco money plays such a significant role
in so many areas of commerce, politics, sports, culture, and edu-
cation,'" that it is difficult to believe that the FDA could pro-
ceed with any measure that threatens the viability of the tobac-
co industry as directly as would regulation of the safety of ciga-
141. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
142. See Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 95-00934 CA (Fla. Dist.
Ct. Aug. 9, 1996).
143. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 175-93.
144. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 617-25.
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rettes as drug delivery devices.
III. TAX "THE BEJESUS OUT OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY": 145 A
PROMISING STRATEGY THAT LOOKS TO THE FUTURE
In the 1960s, the Federal Communications Commission in-
voked the Fairness Doctrine4 6 to require broadcasters that
aired cigarette commercials to begin to run anti-smoking mes-
sages as well. " Richard Kluger quotes a publicist for the
American Cancer Society characterizing the effect of that new
medium for public service announcements against smoking as
"scaring the bejesus out of the tobacco industry."" 8 Whatever
psychological solace one might derive from believing that to have
been the case, the lesson of the last thirty years is that a legal-
business-as-usual approach to the relationship between smoking
and health has failed to accomplish much of what the propo-
nents of the various measures have sought. To break out of the
rut without totally abandoning the conventional legal molds, one
might draw on the quoted language and suggest that serious
thought be given not only to scaring but also to taxing "the
bejesus out of the tobacco industry."
Although higher taxes on tobacco have often been proposed
and enacted, such "sin taxes" have generally functioned primari-
ly as revenue-raising measures.14 A promising strategy for
supplementing whatever else the legal system does with the
smoking and health problem would be to place a tax on tobacco
products that is devoted to the twin goals of deterring smoking
and partially shifting costs of tobacco use from the public at
large to the tobacco industry. Such a strategy is proposed by
Kluger at the end of his lengthy examination of the history of
the tobacco business and the public health,5 ' and different
versions of such a tax strategy have been put into place in three
145. Id. at 310.
146. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
147. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 304-08.
148. Id. at 310.
149. See id at 510-12 (noting that the tobacco industry's profit margins were unaf-
fected by the 1983 increase in the cigarette "sin tax").
150. See id. at 759-63.
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states-California, Massachusetts, and Arizona-in the last
eight years.' 5'
The first major effort along these lines was undertaken in
California in 1988, where a tax increase on tobacco products was
adopted explicitly to fund a variety of government services.'52
Not surprisingly, given the very strong evidence presented in
these books for the lobbying strength of the tobacco inter-
ests,"'53 the California measure (and those in the other two
states to have adopted this approach) originated by referendum
rather than through the normal legislative process." Proposi-
tion 99, as the measure adopted in the November 1988 election
was known, raised the state excise tax on cigarettes from ten
cents per pack to thirty-five cents per pack, with the money
going into a Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund for
distribution to a variety of research, health care, and education-
al purposes.'55 The constitutionality of the measure was at-
tacked soon after its enactment, but it was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of California in Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State
Board of Equalization.'56
The California initiative set out four major uses for the mon-
ey: "an antismoking educational campaign, cancer research,
medical services for indigents, and reforestation of areas ravaged
by cigarette-ignited fires."157 The positive results following its
.enactment, particularly a sixteen percent decline in the per-
centage of smokers,'58 were described by Kluger as "immediate
and sensational."'
Similar legislation has been enacted following successful voter
initiatives approved in Massachusetts in 199260 and in Arizo-
151. See infra notes 155-73 and accompanying text.
152. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 703-05.
153. For a particularly good discussion of tobacco industry lobbying, see HILTS, su-
pra note 11, at 175-84.
154. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 703-04.
155. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30123-30124 (West 1994).
156. 806 P.2d 1360 (Cal. 1991).
157. KLUGER, supra note 6, at 703.
158. The percentage of smokers in California dropped from 25% to 21%. See id. at 705.
159. Id.
160. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
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na in 1994.161 The Massachusetts legislation imposed an addi-
tional excise tax on cigarettes, raising the rate from twenty-six
cents per pack to fifty-one cents."2 The revenue from the addi-
tional tax is credited to a Health Protection Fund," which is
charged with responsibility for financing a variety of educational
and public health programs related to smoking.", Included
among the programs are education and smoking cessation assis-
tance programs in schools and workplaces, and community
health programs for prenatal and youth preventive health care
as long as the programs include smoking cessation assistance
and education about the adverse effects of smoking.'65
An indication of the political attractiveness of an increased
tax on tobacco can be found in the action taken in the 1996 leg-
islative term in Massachusetts to increase the tobacco tax yet
another twenty-five cents per pack, bringing the state tax to sev-
enty-six cents per pack.'66 After the two chambers of the state
legislature worked out their differences in the language of the
legislation, the Governor vetoed the bill, but that veto was over-
ridden in July 1996.67 Because the revenues from this tax in-
crease are to be used to finance such programs as expanded
health insurance coverage for children and subsidies for pre-
scription drugs for the elderly,"e this latest legislative enact-
ment should be seen more as a revenue-raising measure than as
one that is designed expressly to shift smoking-related costs to
the tobacco industry.
The Arizona legislation, following voter approval of Proposi-
tion 200 in the 1994 election, established a Tobacco Tax and
Health Care Fund financed by a tax increase of forty cents per
pack, in addition to higher tax rates on other tobacco prod-
161. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
162. See Brian McGrory, Mass. Voters Pass Cigarette-Tax Hike, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 4, 1992, at 1.
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 64C, § 7(c) (West Supp. 1996).
164. See id. at ch. 29, § 2T.
165. See id.
166. See Shelley Murphy, House Votes To Hike Cigarette Tax To Pay for Health
Care, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 1996, at 36.
167. The veto was overridden by H.B. 6107, 180th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1996).
168. See id.
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ucts.'69 As with the other state ventures along these lines, the
additional tax money is earmarked for educational, research,
and health care financing purposes.'
The programmatic support that a measure of this sort can
provide can be quite substantial. Conservative estimates of the
amount of money expected to be generated by this new tax in
Arizona were far surpassed by actual revenues." The Arizona
legislature initially appropriated thirty-four million dollars for
the programs that were to be financed by the Fund; however,
receipts in the first year of the tax's collection came in at a rate
that would produce more than three times that amount.
The tax increase legislation enacted by these three states is
well worth careful consideration in other jurisdictions, but it is
possible to go even further in moving toward the twin goals of
reducing the incidence of smoking and shifting more of the costs
of the consequences of smoking to the tobacco industry and its
consumers. The dimensions of this more robust tobacco tax in-
crease strategy can be best understood if one looks briefly in
turn at its purpose, its uses, and its implementation.
A. The Purpose of a Tobacco Tax Increase
Two goals justify a substantial increase in tobacco taxes. First,
increases in the price of tobacco products may deter some people
from undertaking the use of the products and may reduce the
rate of use by others. Second, tobacco tax increases can place on
the tobacco industry the costs of a variety of socially beneficial
programs to deal with the consequences of this deadly product.
The consideration of the tobacco tax increase proposal should
rest on both grounds, deterrence and cost shifting. The major
policy shortcoming of previous efforts and proposals has been
the identification of one or the other, rather than both, as the
rationale for the tax. Experience has demonstrated that the twin
rationales are mutually supportive, and together they provide a
169. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1241 (West Supp. 1995).
170. See id. §§ 42-1241 to 1245.
171. See Jonathan Sidener, Tobacco Tax Nets Surprise Windfall: State Sits on Extra




compelling justification for a sizeable increase in the tax on to-
bacco products.
The effectiveness of a tax that attempts to produce a deterrent
effect is related to the. size of the tax increase. A recent study
suggests that a ten percent increase in the size of the tax will
produce a five percent decrease in the smoking population."' If
that rate is accurate, cutting the smoking rate in half could be
accomplished by doubling the tobacco tax. The early experience
following the Massachusetts tax increase suggests a more mod-
est drop in smoking, more on the order of six percent. 4 What-
ever the specific decrease should turn out to be, one can expect a
substantial improvement in public health as some people stop
smoking and others reduce their consumption following a tax
increase.
There is a need for caution, however, about over-promising the
beneficial health effects of a tax increase on tobacco products.
The health benefits of such an increase may not be as high as
anticipated for at least two reasons.
. First, some smokers who pay more for their cigarettes may
change their smoking behavior as a result of the higher price of
the product. Studies within the industry and by government
agencies have established the existence of a phenomenon called
"smoker compensation," where smokers respond to changes in
the content of cigarettes. 5 If the tar and nicotine content of a
cigarette is reduced, smokers may compensate for the different
effect the cigarette produces by taking deeper draws on the ciga-
rette, *reducing or negating whatever health benefits might be
thought to flow from the supposedly safer product. 76 Along
those same lines, one might suspect that at least some consum-
ers would compensate for a higher-priced pack of cigarettes by
smoking more of each cigarette, and perhaps even by compensat-
ing for the fewer packs that are affordable by inhaling deeper on
those cigarettes that are consumed.
A second reason for caution in attributing too much of a
173. See Michael J. Moore, Death and Tobacco Taxes, 27 RAND J. ECON. 415,424 (1996).
174. See Judy Foreman, New Tax May Cut Sales of Tobacco, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
15, 1993, at 29.
175. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 87-91; KLUGER, supra note 6, at 452-53.
176. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 87-91; KLUGER, supra note 6, at 452-53.
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health benefit to an increase in the tobacco tax is the huge profit
margin that the cigarette market has frequently enjoyed.'" If
the demand were to begin to decrease at significant levels, there
could be a considerable cushion within which the industry could
lower its profit and maintain sales at higher levels than would
otherwise be expected if the full effect of the tax increase were
to be passed along to consumers.
Linking a substantial tobacco tax increase to a deterrence goal
may be a considerably more effective strategy for dealing with
the problem of tobacco and health when the focus is directed to
the youngest segment of the tobacco products .market. Demand
for tobacco products may very well display different degrees of
price elasticity at different age groups of smokers. The following
excerpts from two documents from the Brown & Williamson pa-
pers indicate that the industry itself was aware of, and quite
concerned about, the disproportionate impact that excise tax
increases would have on young smokers.
First:
[Ainti-smoking groups may find that one of the most success-
ful methods of reducing the use of tobacco products will be
the enactment of a high rate [of] taxation on such products,
since by this method tobacco products can be priced at a level
so as to place the product-beyond the financial reach of many
consumers.
78
Second: "Excise taxes are related to smoking and health, be-
cause taxes influence the price of cigarettes. The price affects the
ability of young people to buy cigarettes."78
Although there is admittedly a need for caution about claim-
ing excessive benefits from a tax increase, it is undoubtedly true
that smoker behavior will change at the margins. Even though
uncertainty may exist for some time about the size and composi-
tion of those margins, gains in public health ought to be wel-
comed from whatever deterrent effect a tax increase is ultimate-
ly found to produce, particularly if it reduces the affordability of
177. Kluger reports Philip Morris profit margins approaching 40% in the mid-1980s.
See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 581.




tobacco products to young people in the critical years when they
are most likely to become dependent."8
When the cost-shifting goal of the tobacco tax increase is in-
cluded as an essential part of the rationale for the expanded pro-
posal, the additional public benefit traceable to the operation of
the programs to which funds from the increased tax are directed
reinforces the deterrence goal. As suggested above, the combina-
tion of goals for this expanded proposal is critical: the focus on
the good that the tax revenues can accomplish is as significant
as the identification of the harm that the tax itself can deter.
B. The Uses of Increased Tobacco Tax Revenues
The legislation enacted in Massachusetts, California, and Ari-
zona indicates the major uses to which the revenues ought to be
devoted: education of young people, assistance in smoking cessa-
tion, health care for smoking-related illness, scientific research
into the problems associated with tobacco products, and monitor-
ing of the success of the various efforts that are undertaken. 8'
The first order of business to be funded by the revenue gener-
ated by the increased tobacco tax is the reinforcement of the de-
terrence goal by measures other than price increases. Following
the lead of the states that have already adopted a measure of
this sort,'82 the highest priority for the revenue from the tax
increase should be the financing of an effective smoking educa-
tion program directed at young people. Because the FDA pro-
posed regulations requiring the tobacco companies to fund pro-
grams of this sort were deleted from the final rule," there is
even more of a need for state money to be used for this purpose.
An important part of the cost-shifting goal of the tobacco tax
180. About 75% of smokers are addicted by the end of high school. See KLUGER,
supra note 6, at 413.
181. See ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 42-1241(C) (West Supp. 1995) (allocating the
fund's revenues for health education, health research, and the medically needy); CAL.
REv. & TAX. CODE § 30122 (West 1994) (creating a fund from cigarette taxes to sup-
port school and community education programs, disease research, the medically
needy, and environmental conservation efforts); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 29, § 2T
(West Supp. 1996) (establishing a Health Protection Fund for similar purposes).
182. See supra notes 152-72 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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increase can be accomplished by directing some portion of the
tax revenues to financing health care, as is done by each of the
three states that have enacted an increased tobacco tax initia-
tive." 4 An expanded proposal for uses of the revenues ought to
be considered as well, taking the programmatic support one step
further, so that it includes privately as well as publicly funded
health care services. That proposed expansion reacts in part to
developments in the states that have enacted these measures
and in part to the previously expressed perception of the limita-
tions of the state attorney general litigation to recover Medicaid
expenses," s but it is, in any event, a matter of sound public
policy.
The first impetus for expanding the scope of the health care
services that receive funding produced by the revenue earned
from the tobacco tax increases is the recent experience with
those revenues in California. Anytime a new source of revenue
becomes available to a governmental entity, human nature
would suggest that the temptation for legislators or the execu-
tive to divert that money to general purposes will be strong."l 6
One of the more important lessons of the California Proposition
99 experience is that, even though the funds generated by the
increased tobacco tax were earmarked at the outset for specific
uses related to the health effects of smoking, that does not mean
that the temptation to use those funds in a different manner
disappears.' 7 Kluger reports California Governor Pete Wilson's
attempt to use tax revenues generated by Proposition 99 "to plug
his budgetary shortfall." s Legislation has been enacted 89 in
184. See supra note 181.
185. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Prop. 99 Fund Shift on Hold Again, CAL. J. WKLY., Aug. 1995, at 7,
8 [hereinafter Prop. 99 Fund Shift] (reporting that the new bill diverts $64 million
from anti-tobacco education and research toward direct medical research as a repri-
oritization of funds).
187. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30122, 30122(a) (West 1994) (mandating that
funds from the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund be used only for (1)
tobacco-related education programs; (2) "[t]obacco-related disease research"; (3) medi-
cal and hospital care for the indigent; and (4) fire prevention programs, environmen-
tal conservation, wildlife areas, state and local parks, and recreation purposes).
188. KLUGER, supra note 6, at 705.
189. Legislation approved by the governor on July 27, 1995, reapportioned funds
from the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv.
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recent sessions of the California legislature to alter the formula
allocating the tax revenues among the six accounts established
by the original legislation."9 Court challenges succeeded in
blocking some of the earlier diversions, 9' but similar efforts
can be expected to continue as the tobacco tax revenues flowing
into the special fund offer inviting targets for legislators who are
hard-pressed for ways to finance other programs.
The innovative part of the proposal being set out in this Re-
view Essay is that this proposal would not follow either of the
two models for tobacco tax-related health care financing that
have been put forward in the past. Under the measures enacted
in Arizona, California, and Massachusetts, 92 and in the claims
asserted by the state attorneys general against the tobacco in-
dustry,'93 the tobacco tax revenues are intended to reimburse
the state for the costs of health care provided to indigents under
the state's Medicaid responsibility. Under the Clinton Adminis-
tration health care reform initiative" and in the latest Massa-
chusetts tobacco tax legislation,'95 on the other hand, inc'reases
in tobacco taxes are viewed as an important source of funding for
the provision of broad-based, if not truly universal, health care
services. What needs to be considered instead is a high priority
use of the revenues that sets a course between those two models.
The cost-shifting function of the tobacco tax increase proposal
is best served if its focus is directed at the smoking-related costs
of the health care system at large, not just at the smaller subset
of costs that are financed directly by public authorities. If health
580 (West). That legislation was effective through July 1, 1996, with the amend-
ments scheduled to be repealed on January 1, 1997. See id. 1996 Cal. A.B. 3487,
approved by the governor on July 20, 1996, extended the diversions until July 1,
1997. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1355 (West).
190. The six accounts comprising the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund
are the Health Education Account, the Hospital Services Account, the Physician Ser-
vices Account, the Research Account, the Public Services Account, and the
Unallocated Account. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 30122(b) (West 1994).
191. Prop. 99 Fund Shift, supra note 186, at 7 (reporting that two restraining orders
have been issued to prevent legislatively enacted fund transfer of tobacco tax money).
192. See supra note 152-72 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
194. WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNSEL, THE PRESIDENTS HEALTH SECURITY
PLAN 96 (1993).
195. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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care providers could be reimbursed from a tobacco tax fund for
services provided to a wider class of patients than just the needy
for the treatment of smoking-related conditions, then the cost of
insuring for other services ought to decline.
This expansion in the uses of the tax revenues can be accom-
plished by adapting a class-based relief model to the context of
the smoking-related illnesses. Epidemiologists should be able to
determine the extent to which the rates of certain medical condi-
tions within a state are higher than would be the case if there
were no use of tobacco products. That estimate of the cost of
smoking-related health care can be used as a distributional
baseline for health care providers so that a proportional share of
the revenues from the tax fund roughly corresponds to the ser-
vices rendered by that provider.
The tax increase being suggested here is designed to shift spe-
cific costs from the public at large to the tobacco industry
through the imposition of the additional tax, but it is important
to acknowledge that there is already a significant tax levy on
tobacco products."' Presumably, existing tobacco excise taxes
are already being used for important governmental purposes, and
that support should continue at existing levels. The cost-shifting
and programmatic support associated with the increase in the
tobacco tax should be seen as a supplement to what is currently
being done with the excise tax, not as simply a realignment of
the tax burdens or as a substitute for those current uses.
Just as it was previously emphasized that deterrence alone
offers only part of the rationale for the tobacco tax increase, so
too is it the case that cost-shifting needs to be understood as an
incomplete justification for this tax proposal if it were to be di-
vorced from the deterrence goal. Some of the economics litera-
ture on tobacco taxes suggests that earlier mortality associated
with smoking saves society more in resources than the smokers
actually pay in tobacco excise tax.19' Although this thesis
would seem to place the tobacco industry in the awkward posi-
196. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 735 (reporting that the 1992 average federal-
state tax levy on cigarettes was $.46).
197. See W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of
Smoking, 9 TAx POLlY & ECON. 51, 75 (1995).
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tion of claiming to be performing a public service by marketing
lethal products, it also points out the need for caution in pro-
nouncing that the health effects of smoking constitute a net
economic loss for society.'98
C. "The Implementation of a Tobacco Tax Increase
The politics of the last decade and a half offer ample support
for the proposition that suggesting tax increases is the function-
al equivalent of grabbing an uninsulated electric wire: it may
create quite a sensation at the time, but it is not recommended
for long-term well-being.199 Still, the experience of the Califor-
nia, Massachusetts, and Arizona electorates in approving initia-
tives offers considerable encouragement to those who would
propose that the public could support a specifically targeted tax
increase that was consistent with its underlying image of what
government ought to do and how it ought to be done.
In a politically charged environment, which history suggests is
always the case when the tobacco industry's interests are threat-
ened,"0 capturing the imaginative high ground is an essential
part of the battle for public support.2"' The nature of the pro-
posal can be conveyed by a label that underscores the fact that
the increased tax on tobacco products is not a measure that
would add to the general revenues of the government but in-
stead would be linked directly to programs and effects that are
in the public interest. The goals of the tax proposal might be ex-
pressed in a label such as "The Health Tax on Tobacco."
198. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 734-37.
199. See HILTS, supra note 11, at 175-84 (describing the wealth and influence of
the tobacco lobby, which can be withdrawn from, or used to back opponents of legis-
lators disfavored by the tobacco industry).
200. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 681-90 (describing the tobacco industry's concen-
trated lobbying efforts to combat society's increasingly intolerant view of smoking).
201. An example of this phenomenon is the advertising campaign employed by
those involved in the public health campaign to reduce the underage and minority
populations' use of tobacco products. A rap music video is used to mock the tobacco
industry and to lower some of the putative glamour associated with tobacco use.
Video lyrics include "We use to pick it. Now they want us to smoke it. Yeah right,
you must be jokin' . . . . Tobacco blacks it's killin' many." See Shari Roan, Laker,
Rapper Team Up To Carry Anti-Smoking Message to Blacks, L.A. TIMEs, June 12,
1990, at A3; KLUGER, supra note 5, at 704.
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The appropriate size of the tax increase must depend on an
assessment of a variety of political and pragmatic factors in the
taxing state. The nature and the scope of each of the functions of
the tax increase proposal-how much deterrence should occur
because of the increased tax on the tobacco industry and how
much cost-shifting ought to be accomplished through the
tax-are the most critical determinants of the tax rate. In the
three states that have enacted such a provision, the increases
ranged from twenty-five cents per pack in California and Massa-
chusetts to forty cents per pack in Arizona."2
One final aspect of the proposal for an increased tax on tobac-
co products needs to be addressed. Anytime a tax proposal con-
templates action on a state level that is likely not to be replicat-
ed by other states, one needs to anticipate the consequences of
taxpayers looking for tax avoidance strategies."' The Massa-
chusetts experience, for example, included a period of hoarding
of tobacco products in the period just before the tax increase
went into effect.
2°4
When the tax is going to be levied on products that are sold in
every state but taxed only in a few states, the tax can be avoid-
ed simply by purchasing the products in untaxed states.0 5 Al-
though a law can be passed banning the importation of those
untaxed items, one needs to account for the effects of the smug-
gling of tobacco products from low-tax states to high-tax states.
After Arizona enacted its Tobacco Tax and Health Care Fund
legislation in 1994, state agents confiscated 1.5 million ciga-
rettes smuggled in from lower tax states.06
The most serious impact of avoiding the higher taxes by pur-
chasing cigarettes in a lower tax state is obviously the lower tax
revenue that is available for the programs supported by the tax
202. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 64C, § 6 (West Supp. 1996); KLUGER, supra
note 6, at 704, 735.
203. See Foreman, supra note 174, at 29 (accounting for a 33% decrease cigarette
sales by noting increased sales in neighboring states).
204. Cigarette sales rose 20% in the month before the tax hike took effect, and
declined sharply in the first month in which the increased tax was imposed. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Sidener, supra note 171, at Al. Arizona law makes possession of more
than 10,000 untaxed cigarettes (50 cartons) a felony. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN § 42-
137(E), (F) (West Supp. 1995).
646 [Vol. 38:605
TOBACCO DEATHS
increase, but that revenue loss problem can be solved fairly easi-
ly. Before the higher tax takes effect, the taxing state could es-
tablish a baseline of tobacco products sales in its own state and
in the adjoining areas that would be the most likely venues to
which its citizens would divert their purchase dollars to the low-
er taxed products. When the tax increase goes into effect, moni-
toring of the sales volumes in the respective areas can be used
to gather data that would show shifting purchase patterns. The
taxing state could then simply adopt a presumption that any
increase in sales in the adjacent areas is attributable to tax
avoidance by its citizens, absent some convincing explanation to
the contrary.
Because the changing purchase practice of its citizens removes
the possibility of collecting the tax based on the sales transac-
tion itself, the presumption of tax avoidance would then have to
form the basis for a surtax levied on the tobacco industry to cov-
er the taxes that would have been collected had the taxing
state's citizens continued to purchase the products within the
state. Each tobacco company would be required to pay to the
taxing state, over and above its other tax burden, a share of the
tax that would have been levied on the "shifted sales" in propor-
tion to the sales of its products within the taxing state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evidence is irrefutable that cigarettes and other tobacco
products have been responsible for untold misery and massive
expense in the last century. Undoing that history of suffering
and death is of course impossible, but we owe it to future gener-
ations to address the health effects of tobacco products in a man-
ner both more realistic and more courageous than that which
has been displayed in the story recounted in these most recent
books on the industry.
In the last two years, the legal system has moved from torpor
to ferment on the tobacco and health issue, proceeding more ag-
gressively on the half dozen litigation and regulatory fronts sur-
veyed in this Review Essay. Although activity on those fronts is
useful and the benefits are surely welcome, the viability of each
as a long-term strategy raises at least a sufficient level of con-
cern that the search for a solution to the smoking and health
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problem needs to continue to expand into new areas.
The proposal set out here for a tobacco tax increase that is
specifically directed at deterrence and cost-shifting goals offers
another avenue for further investigation. Perhaps the strongest
selling point for a strategy of increasing tobacco taxes is that it
is forward-looking in its effects. Instead of going back and as-
sessing blame for past transgressions, it offers a potential com-
mon ground on which citizens and policy makers can deal with
the consequences of smoking on the public health and the public
fisc, and can support effective measures to reduce those conse-
quences over time.
The experience in the three states that have adopted more
limited versions of the tax needs to be examined carefully. If
that experience turns out to be positive, ways to capitalize on
the strengths of this technique and to extend its application can
be developed. It is true that no policy or program is going to be a
panacea, but it is equally true that no promising path ought to
be ignored.
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